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Abstract Worldwide governance organizations and regulators have recently called
for more enhanced disclosures about how organizations manage risks. Enter-
prise Risk Management (ERM) is recognized as a value-contributing best prac-
tice even when legal standards do not require it (Whitman in Risk Manag Insur
Rev 18(2):161–197, 2015), but public disclosure on such a process is not generally
mandatory. In Italy emphasis on risk disclosure started in 2008 but it was the 2011
revision of the Corporate Governance (CG) code for listed companies to ask for
the board commitment in disclosing, within the CG report, about the main internal
control and risk management system’s characteristics (Borsa Italiana in Codice di
Autodisciplina, 2011). Given the proprietary nature of risk information in addition to
the Italian capital market characteristics (small capitalization and presence of a domi-
nant shareholder) and the lack of any mandate for what specific aspects board should
disclose, the study aims at investigating a potential variation between private and
public disclosure on ERM. Relying on the ERM concepts provided by the COSO
framework (2004) the author submitted a survey seeking information about ERM
practices within Italian listed companies. Such a private information is compared to
public CG reports released by the same companies. The comparison shows compa-
nies tend to privately reveal a more effective ERM process than the one they publicly
disclose. An examination of CG and firm’s risk variables potentially determining
higher variation—i.e. information inconsistency—supports proprietary costs theory
rather than agency theory expectations. Thus showing the limits of voluntary dis-
closure dealing with risk management systems. The study might have international
policy implications.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, a number of corporate governance-focused entities have issued calls for
effective risk management processes within organizations including the introduction
of specific corporate governance (CG) bodies, such as Chief Risk Officers (CRO)
and/or risk committees (Brown et al. 2009).
The European Directive 2001/65/EC on “transparency” introduced in Europe
new requirements for management reporting including disclosure on risk. Further,
the obligation in directive 2006/46/CE to describe the risk management systems
requires also the explanation of risk management functions, policies, structures, and
procedures. Europeanfinancial companies are also required to have some risk process
standards. Large banks, for instance, have to comply with the international regula-
tory frameworkBasel III (Directive 2013/36/EUandRegulation (EU)No. 575/2013).
Likewise, insurance companies are subject to Solvency II (Directive 2009/138/CE)
and they must complete their “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA)” for fil-
ingwith state insurance regulators. Those initiatives require to implement an effective
and integrated risk management process and to report focusing on the enterprise risk
management effectiveness. Further, other international voluntary disclosure initia-
tives ask for information relates to risk and risk management process [see for all the
content elements of the Integrated Reporting framework (IIRC 2013)].
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) definition in the current paper relies on the
Enterprise RiskManagement—Integrated Framework issued byCommittee of Spon-
soringOrganizations of the Treadway Commission. It is themost adopted framework
(Hayne and Free 2014) providing guidance about the key elements of an effective,
top-down, enterprise-wide approach to risk management and defining ERM as “a
process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel,
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential
events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the entity’s objectives”
(COSO 2004).
In response to so much international attention and push on ERM as part of good
corporate governance, risk management information is expected to be increasingly
sought by the firm’s stakeholders and information users (Lajili and Zeghal 2005).
Nevertheless, previous literature on risk disclosure has limited its focus on risk factors
(Beretta and Bozzolan 2004; Linsley and Shrives 2005, 2006) rather than exploring
the disclosure of ERM practices.
In Italy, emphasis on risk disclosure stems from a consultative document that was
issued in 2008 by the Council of Italian Chartered Accountants (IRDCEC 2008) to
assist entities with implementing the new directives’ requirements (Elshandidy and
Neri 2015). Specifically, since the 2011 revision of the CG code for listed companies
it follows the board commitment in disclosing, within the CG report, about the main
internal control and risk management system’s characteristics (Borsa Italiana 2011;
art. 7.C.1.d; see Table 1). Further, the 2015 review of the CG code compulsorily
enhances the disclosure on the risk management process.
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Table 1 Risk management duties according to the 2011 Italian CG code
Subject Duties
Board of Directors (BoD) – Lead the internal control and risk management
(ICRM) system to favour the identification,
measurement, management, and control of risks in
the company and its subsidiaries, according to its
risk appetite and its strategy
– Evaluate, at least yearly, the suitability and the
effectiveness of the ICRM system according to the
characteristics of the company and its risk appetite
– Endorse, at least yearly, the IC program, consulting
the Board of Statutory Auditors (BoSA) and the
ICR officer
– Describe in the CG report the main features and the
suitability of the ICRM system
– Assess, in accordance with the BoSA, the results of
the external audit
– Appoint and overrule the internal audit manager,
ensure the availability of his resources, and define
his remuneration according to the company’s
policies
Internal Control and Risk (ICR)
committee
– Evaluate, in collaboration with the chief financial
officer, the external auditor, and the BoSA, the
accuracy of the use of accounting principles
– Give opinions about the approach to the
identification of the firm’s risks
– Study the reports provided by the ICRM system and
the internal audit function
– Check the independency, suitability, effectiveness,
and efficacy of the internal audit function
– Report to the BoD, at least biyearly, about its
activity and the suitability of the ICRM system
Internal Control and Risk (ICR) officer – Identify the company’s risks, with reference to the
of the business, and report timely on risks to the
BoD
– Carry out the guidelines provided by the BoD,
programming, executing, and managing the ICRM
system, maintaining constant control of its
suitability and effectiveness
– Accomplish the coordination of the ICRM system
with the operating and regulatory conditions
– Ask for verifications from the internal audit
function regarding compliance with rules and
strategy, reporting to the BoD, the ICR committee,
and the BoSA
– Report timely to the ICR committee (in case of
absence to the BoD) about identified critical issues
Source Florio and Leoni (2017)
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The relationship between risk management disclosure and corporate governance
is of interest to regulators because less concentrated ownership and independent
directors are expected to reduce agency problems, and thus reduce the need for
regulatory intervention in corporate reporting (Abraham and Cox 2007). Following
this increasing push for transparency on ERM and considering most of account-
ing regulators—including corporate governance ones—do not ask for uniform and
mandatory information about that, there is a call for examining this specific dis-
closure attempting to answer the overarching research question: To what extent are
public disclosures consistent with what companies privately declare about their inter-
nal ERM process? The answer can be important especially in a setting where capital
market is characterized by a dominant shareholder and expectation is that of greater
information asymmetry overcame by an increasing regulatory demand for voluntary
ERM disclosure (e.g. Italy).
Considering ERM is recognized as a value-contributing best practice in CG even
when legal standards do not require it (Whitman 2015), this paper adopts the ERM
fundamental concepts provided by COSO (2004) and operatively aims at investigat-
ing the consistency of ERM information in a setting of voluntary disclosure exam-
ining: (1) the nature and extent of variation between public disclosure compared to
a private source of information on ERM practices and (2) the determinants of higher
variation—interpreted as information inconsistency.
These two research questions can provide impetus to the debate in accounting
regulation, here intended as including corporate governance regulations on risk man-
agement disclosure, and practice among national and international regulatory bodies
as they try to harmonize their efforts. Thus, providing results which can show poten-
tial limits emerging from the practices and investigating the determinants of higher
variation which may indicate the conditions under which this happens.
To answer the former research question, in linewithMarshall andWeetman (2002)
the author compared data collected from two disclosure sources: a private on-line
survey submitted to all Italian listed companies, and the public CG reports drafted by
the same respondents’ companies. A score is developed for both the private and the
public source of disclosure on ERM. The difference between the two scores allowed
the identification of the level of disclosure variation on ERM and the investigation
of the information (in)consistency.
Finally, to answer the second researchquestion, adopting a theoretical comparative
approach, the paper examines corporate governance factors (board independence
and ownership’s concentration) and firm’s risk characteristics (leverage and market
to book ratio) as determinants explaining information inconsistency about ERM
practices. Therefore, the paper helps extending previous literature on risk disclosure
focusing on ERM process instead of risk factors. In addition, prior research mainly
analyzes entities in a non-financial setting while the current study takes into account
also financial companies. Results showing howmost of the companies’ public reports
are inconsistent with the private disclosure on the internal process shed insights that
may support the need for more disclosure transparency. In particular, companies tend
to not fully disclose information about ERM processes in place. That is, the private
disclosure suggests more extensive ERM processes than public disclosures reveal.
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The study finds that board independence, the extent of ownership’s concentration,
the extent of leverage, market to book ratio, companies size, financial industry, and
years of ERMexperience are factors associatedwith information inconsistency in the
setting analyzed. Findings show the proprietary costs’ limits of voluntary disclosure
dealing with ERM systems, while supporting the decision of the Italian Corporate
Governance committee to compulsorily enhance additional disclosure at the aim of
improving transparency about these processes. The next section presents the prior
studies on risk management disclosure that allow to motivate the need for an explicit
focus on the ERM process disclosure and the theoretical background relying on
managers’ incentives theories used in the paper to develop the hypotheses. Sections
about the research design, analysis and results are then provided. Finally, conclusions
with a discussion of the key findings.
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development
Healy and Palepu (2001) claim investors view voluntary disclosures as credible infor-
mation. Prior literature on risk disclosure has predominantly examined the nature and
extent of risk disclosures and their influencing factors by applying content analyses
to data collected from annual reports (Buckby et al. 2015). Indeed, most of the prior
studies focused on the investigation of risk factors in terms of information quality
(Beretta and Bozzolan 2004; Oliveira et al. 2011; Miihkinen 2012; Abraham and
Shrives 2014), and their determinants (Linsley and Shrives 2005, 2006; Abraham
and Cox 2007; Amran et al. 2009; Hassan 2009; Elshandidy et al. 2013; Elshandidy
andNeri 2015). Differently, Buckby et al. (2015) focus on riskmanagement practices
disclosure in corporate governance reports.
Risk management information is expected to be increasingly sought by the firm’s
stakeholders and information users (Lajili and Zeghal 2005). The benefits of enhanc-
ing risk management disclosure could be many (Courtnage 1998). For instance,
knowledge of the ERM may help investors in assessing the usefulness of financial
reports in predicting future cash flows (Baxter et al. 2013). Investors in additionmight
incorporate risk information into their price decisions and thus improve the market
liquidity by reducing information asymmetry (Campbell et al. 2014). Nevertheless,
a key constraint on empirical research on management control systems is the lack of
information on what corporations do internally (Zimmerman 2001).
Prior scant literature shows corporations disclose only minimal details of their
risk management program (Tufano 1996; Maizatulakma et al. 2015; Buckby et al.
2015) and risk management disclosure becomes a compliance exercise (Collier et al.
2007). Further Marshall and Weetman (2002) find evidence that, even for specific
risk management practices (i.e. disclosure of foreign exchange risk management) in
a mandatory disclosure regime, companies persist to have information asymmetry.
Specifically, companies tend to publicly disclose less information in the annual report
compared to what they declare privately in a prior questionnaire.
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Managers’ incentives theories (agency and proprietary costs) are used in the cur-
rent paper to explain potential variation in voluntary disclosures released by firms
(privately vs. publicly). The most adopted agency theory proposes that in public
companies the interests of managers diverge from those of the owners (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). For the owners, solutions include corporate control mechanisms to
counter managerial power and CG tomonitor management and improve accountabil-
ity (O’Sullivan 2000). In the risk literature agency theory has been widely used in the
area of disclosure (Abraham and Cox 2007; Oliveira et al. 2011; Tao and Hutchinson
2013; Buckby et al. 2015) and ERM characteristics (Beasley et al. 2005, 2008).
Proprietary cost theory (Verrecchia 1983) instead focuses on the competitive dis-
advantage of greater disclosure. Proprietary costs indeed include not only the costs
of preparing, disseminating and auditing information, but also the cost deriving from
disclosing information which may be used by competitors and other parties in a way
that is harmful for the reporting company (Prencipe 2004). The threat of economic
disadvantage may give rise to disincentives to disclose risk information voluntar-
ily (Dobler 2008). Proprietary cost theory argues that the incentive of disclosing
information is a decreasing function of the potential costs attached to a disclosure,
and that it is an increasing function of the favorableness of the news in a disclo-
sure (Verrecchia 1983). Whether proprietary costs are higher than the benefits of full
disclosure, managers have incentives to not disclose (Prencipe 2004). Abraham and
Shrives (2014) adopt proprietary cost theory to explain the behavior emerging from
their results, suggesting that company managers prefer providing formal rather than
substantial risk disclosures.
2.1 Determinants Hypothesized to Affect Inconsistency
on ERM Disclosure
A significant body of literature demonstrates that the monitoring function of corpo-
rate governance significantly influences the propensity for better voluntary disclosure
(see Patelli and Prencipe 2007). Governance and ownership factors may play a vital
role in firms’ risk reporting because directors are accountable for the CG report pre-
pared for shareholders. Thus, the governance arrangements of the board of directors
can be expected to influence disclosure policy. In particular, relying on Patelli and
Prencipe (2007), who focus on the Italian stock market which is dominated by com-
panies characterized by the presence of a dominant shareholder, the current paper
investigates two main mechanisms of CG that may affect agency costs in such a
context.
First, the presence of independent directors (Abraham andCox 2007; Lajili 2007).
Independent directors are considered to enhance the quality of the board as they are
expected to be more unbiased representatives of shareholders due to an assumed
absence of conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent (O’Sullivan
2000). Furthermore, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argue that a board comprising more
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independent directors is more likely to promote high quality performance-related
disclosure. Thus, agency theory claims more independent directors may provide
greater information on risk and ERM to reduce agency costs, resulting in reduced
information asymmetry and lower inconsistency.
Previous research identifies a positive relation between the number of independent
directors and voluntary risk disclosure (Abraham andCox 2007; Oliveira et al. 2011).
Proprietary costs theory expectations are aligned to agency theory. Accordingly,
companies with higher percentages of independent directors are expected to have a
lower variation between public and private source of information on the ERM pro-
cess. Thus, it is expected a negative association between the number of independent
directors and greater variation between public and private source of information on
the ERM process—i.e. inconsistency.
Hyp 1 There is a negative association between the number of independent directors
and information inconsistency about the ERM process.
Second, the nature of the specific ownership structure (Abraham and Cox 2007;
Kajüter 2006; Lajili 2007). In ownership structures more closely held, agency costs
are generally lower (Ball et al. 2000).High concentrated ownership indeed plays a key
role in controlling and monitoring the firm mitigating agency costs. Thus, in highly
concentrated ownership structure, public disclosure is less needed and proprietary
costs of voluntary disclosure higher. On the contrary, in companies less closely held
there is more need to monitoring managers’ activities, and a greater level of public
disclosure is expected given its lower proprietary costs. Therefore, the inverse relation
between agency costs and proprietary costs allow to hypothesize—according to both
the theories—that highly closely held companies have low agency costs but higher
proprietary costs. Thus, showing greater information inconsistency.
Hyp 2 There is a positive association between highly closely held companies and
information inconsistency about the ERM process.
Although a range of disclosure studies have documented the impact of various
influentialCG factors on the level of riskmanagement disclosures, little prior research
has addressed the possible impact of companies’ risk-related factors (Buckby et al.
2015). Because risk is inherently proprietary in nature (Woods et al. 2008), propri-
etary cost theorywould suggest that higher risky companies disclose less information
not willing to attract market attention. A first risk-related factor considered is lever-
age. Literature on the association between risk disclosures and leverage offers mixed
results. Specifically, agency theory by Jensen andMeckling (1976) argues that highly
leveraged firms have higher monitoring costs. Such firms may seek to reduce these
costs by disclosing more information in their annual report narratives. Neverthe-
less, most of empirical studies (Linsley and Shrives 2006; Abraham and Cox 2007;
Amran et al. 2009; Oliveira et al. 2011) find that leverage in listed companies does
not significantly affect risk disclosure. Just Elshandidy et al. (2013) find a positive
association between leverage and aggregated risk disclosures.
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Whereas, proprietary cost theory suggests that debt is negatively related to corpo-
rate disclosure levels: managers of companies having less risk or a better risk man-
agement process have less costs of disclosing their better ability; companies having
higher risks are less prone to disclose about them because of proprietary costs such as
deriving from competitive reasons. To the best of author knowledge, no prior study
investigated the relation between leverage and risk disclosure according to propri-
etary cost theory. Further in the Italian capital market there are factors that seem to
support such a theory: firms are composed by a dominant shareholder (Patelli and
Prencipe 2007; Allegrini and Greco 2013) find a negative but non-significant rela-
tion between leverage and the general level of disclosure. Thus, the current paper
hypothesizes a positive relationship between leverage and greater variation between
public and private source of information on ERM in the analyzed context.
Hyp 3 There is a positive association between company’s leverage and information
inconsistency about the ERM process.
Finally, a second risk-related factor is themarket to book ratio (Francis et al. 2008;
Baxter et al. 2013) measured as the ratio between the firm’s market capitalization and
the book value of shareholder’s equity. According to agency theory and consistent
with Buckby et al. (2015) bigger market to book ratio indicates greater expectations
about future cash flows than a lower ratio. As future cash flows are inherently uncer-
tain, high market to book ratio firms tend to have more volatile share prices than
small market to book ratio firms. Thus, companies with larger market to book ratio
are expected to disclose greater amount of information.
According to proprietary cost theory only firms financially sound may be able to
trade off the benefits from additional disclosure with the cost of revealing potentially
damaging information (Cormier and Magnan 2003). Thus, given higher market to
book ratio is interpreted as greater expectation about future cash flows, it is expected
these firms are able to better bear proprietary costs despite the greater financial risk
and to disclose more information. Therefore, relying on the interpretation of both
agency and proprietary cost theories it is expected a negative relation between the
market to book ratio factor and greater variation between public and private source
of information on the ERM process.
Hyp 4 There is a negative association between company’s market to book ratio and
information inconsistency about the ERM process.
3 Research Design
3.1 Sample Selection and Data: The Italian Institutional
Context
In Italy the debate and regulation on corporate governance emerged around the 2000s.
Both financial scandals and financial crisis of those years not only affected the US,
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but also European countries, and Italy in particular (Florio and Leoni 2017). For
this reason, several regulatory reforms took place and Italy was one of the former
countries adopting a Corporate Governance (CG) Code drafted by the Italian stock
exchange Corporate Governance Committee in 1999. Then reviewed in 2002, 2006,
2010, 2011, 2014 and in 2015. The code is based on the “comply or explain” principle
according to which listed companies may decide whether to adopt it. If companies do
not comply—fully or partially—they need to explain the reason. The changes in the
Italian regulation highlight the importance of board structure and the independent
directors as a means to overcome Italian market weaknesses such as the markedly
concentrated ownership and the trend for large owners to expropriate minority share-
holders (Elshandidy and Neri 2015).
Since the 2011 Corporate Governance revision, greatest attention has been put on
risk with a specific appendix included to discuss the importance of risk management
disclosure. The revision recommends the creation of an integrated system of internal
control and riskmanagement (Borsa Italiana 2011; art. 7.C.1.a). The Internal Control
and Risk Management shall be integrated and treated as a unitary system focused on
risks, and integrated within the overall organizational, administrative and accounting
system of the firm (Florio and Leoni 2017). It follows the board commitment in
disclosing,within theCG report, about themain internal control and riskmanagement
system’s characteristics (Borsa Italiana 2011; art. 7.C.1.d; see Table 1).
Thus, the choice of an Italian sample may be useful from an international per-
spective considering the possible interest in the results by a European audience. The
obligation in directive 2006/46/CE to describe the risk management systems requires
the explanation of risk management functions, policies, structures, and procedures.
The resulting risk governance requirements and recommendation for listed compa-
nies by each European member State reveals how the Italian context is the only one
(not only at the European level) recommending and requiring through the Corporate
Governance code or laws all the following:
– specific provisions describing the board responsibilities for risk management;
– the establishment of a board-level committee charged with risk management;
– the implementation of the internal control and risk management system;
– the identification of a person in charge of risk management (OECD 2014).
Further, in 2015 RiskManagement duties were partially increased. Specifically, it
was introduced the obligation to “transparently disclose in the Corporate Governance
report the coordination among people and bodies designed to the Internal Control
Risk Management System” (Borsa Italiana 2015; art. 7.C.1 lett. D). The Corporate
Governance committee which approved the revised code invited the companies to
apply the changeswithin the following year reporting. Thus, the recent 2015 reviewof
the CG code compulsorily enhances the disclosure on the risk management process.
Furthermore, it has to point out how a mandatory description of the main risks
and uncertainties is requested in theManagement Discussion and Analysis (MD&A)
sectionof the annual report sinceLegislativeDecree no. 32/2007 thatmodifiedArticle
2428of theCivilCode (Elshandidy andNeri 2015).Therefore,managers have already
to explain in detail all of the risks faced by their company during the past year, and
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how they have managed these risks, in their annual reports. However, the focus of
the current paper is on the ERM process disclosure, thus attention is on the annual
CG report.1
The sample is drawn from companies listed into the ordinary market of the Italian
Stock Exchange at the end of the years 2013 and 2015.2 The year selection is driven
by two main reasons. First, in 2011 there was the greatest amendment of the Italian
Corporate Governance code effective from 2012. The choice of the year 2013 aims
at reflecting a sufficient time for listed companies to achieve compliance to the 2011
revision of the code in particular about the riskmanagement duties.Given the partially
increased duties of the risk management system in 2015, CG reports referring to this
fiscal year are the last ones before the revised code. Thus representing the last year
in which companies can disclosure more information on internal control and risk
management system on voluntary basis. Therefore, the period selection constitutes a
time frame in which there have been no institutional changes about risk management
duties to disclose in the CG report. Thus helping to better investigate the voluntary
disclosure on the ERM process. Second, survey methodology asks for repeating the
survey after two years at the aim of increasing reliability to the analysis.
In total, the author received 75 completed surveys (32 in 2013 and additional 43
in 2015). She excluded 9 companies because of incomplete questionnaires or due to
missing CG reports (4 in 2013; 5 in 2015), leaving a final sample of 66 companies
for the analysis.3
Table 2 provides the profile of the sample. In terms of positions held by the
respondents, individuals serving in high-level positions (i.e., board members, inter-
nal auditors, Chief Risk Officers and top managers) represent more than 50% of
the respondents. The classification of the represented industries relies on the Italian
Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana) website. More than one third of the respondents
in the sample (34.84) are industrial (manufacturing) companies, followed by finan-
cial industry (19.70%) which includes both banks and insurance companies. Public
services entities—mostly utilities—represent the 12.12% of the sample. In terms of
1An analysis on MD&A section has been done as a robustness check but information about the risk
management process are exclusively provided in the CG reports.
2In line with prior studies to assure homogeneity of listing requirements, those companies listed
in the Star Segment and the Nuovo Mercato Segment have been excluded from the analysis (see
Beretta and Bozzolan 2004; Florio and Leoni 2017).
3The sample size depends on different reasons. First, the high difficulty of data access in Italy and
to set data on this context given the small size of the Italian stock market. Second, the complexity
of collecting data on internal processes as already highlighted by prior studies (Zimmerman 2001).
Nevertheless, the overall response rate reflects about the 30% of the total number of Italian listed
companies (on average 255 in the main Italian market in the considered time span excluding those
companies not compliant to the CG code). In addition, the response rate is higher than previous
studies adopting the survey methodology (see Beasley et al. 2005; Paape and Speklé 2012). Further,
there are many prior studies on risk disclosure with a similar sample size (see for instance, Beretta
and Bozzolan 2004; Allini et al. 2016). Finally, considering Italy is the 8th largest country in the
world based on GDP and it has an advance environment in terms of risk management disclosure
since 2011, the data collected represent the ERM practices of a large part of the Italian market
capitalization (about the 40% of the total market capitalization in the years of analysis).
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revenues size, almost 50% of the companies range between e25 million and e500
million. Only a few companies have revenues lower than e25 million. In addition,
more than half of respondents (56.06%) indicate their organizations have adopted
an enterprise risk management process for at least 3 years. Therefore, it is expected
that ERM process as described both in the survey and in the CG reports is quite
developed.
4 Three-Stage Approach
The analysis is based on a three-stage approach. First, to investigate the ERM internal
practices, an online survey tool consisting of 30 questions has been structured relying
on the ERM definition developed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission (COSO) in the 2004 framework4 and its fundamental
concepts.5
The ERM definition reflects certain fundamental concepts, which are highlighted
explicitly in the COSO framework, according to which “Enterprise risk management
is:
1. A process, ongoing and flowing through an entity;
2. Effected by people at every level of an organization;
3. Applied in strategy setting;
4. Applied across the enterprise, at every level and unit, and includes taking an
entity-level portfolio view of risk;
5. Designed to identify potential events that, if they occur, will affect the entity and
to manage risk within its risk appetite;
6. Able to provide reasonable assurance to an entity’s management and board of
directors;
7. Geared to achievement of objectives in one or more separate but overlapping
categories.”
From the operational point of view, most of the survey’s questions require a
five-point scale response developed according to prior literature (see details in the
Appendix). The two highest options are considered to represent an ERM implemen-
tation according to the COSO (2004) definition, while the three lowest options are not
considered to be reflective of an ERM component. Survey data are coded according
to the score obtained by respondents; a value of 0 is attributed in case of no answer
to the items of interest related to each of the seven fundamental concepts.
4The author is aware of the changed ERM definition according to the recent COSO draft (2016)
which states the following: The culture, capabilities, and practices, integrated with strategy-setting
and its execution, that organizations rely on to manage risk in creating, preserving, and realizing
value. However, given the intention to investigate the level of ERM implementation in the Italian
setting the author choices to rely on the most adopted framework (Hayne and Free 2014; and as
supported by results) at the period of analysis.
5Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework Executive summary (2004).
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Table 2 Profile of the sample
2013 2015 Total number
of respondents
% number of
respondents
Respondents position held
Board member – 2 2 3.03
Chief risk officer 6 4 10 15.15
Internal auditor 6 3 9 13.64
Top manager
(CEO/CFO)
4 10 14 21.21
Middle manager 10 17 27 40.91
Not available 2 2 4 6.06
N 28 38 66 100
Industry represented
Chemical and basic
material
– 1 1 1.52
Consumer goods 4 6 10 15.15
Consumer services – 3 3 4.55
Financial 6 7 13 19.70
Health care – 1 1 1.52
Industrial 10 13 23 34.84
IT 4 1 5 7.57
Oil and gas – 2 2 3.03
Public services 4 4 8 12.12
Revenues
e0 ≤ x ≤ e5 million 2 7 9 13.64
e5 million ≤ x ≤ e25
million
1 1 2 3.03
e25 million ≤ x ≤ e100
million
8 8 16 24.24
e100 million ≤ x ≤
e500 million
6 11 17 25.75
e500 million ≤ x ≤ e1
billion
3 8 11 16.67
x > e1 billion 8 3 11 16.67
Year of ERM adoption
Less than 6 months 5 12 17 25.76
At least 1 year 3 9 12 18.18
At least 3 years 6 11 17 25.76
At least 5 years 12 5 17 25.75
10 years 2 1 3 4.55
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The second stage of the analysis is based on the hand collection of respondents
CG reports related to the year of survey collection (i.e. 2013 survey matched with
2013 CG report and 2015 survey with 2015 CG report). A thematic content analysis
(Buckby et al. 2015) has been done on the CG reports section regarding the internal
control and risk management system. Specifically, information has been categorized
according to themes corresponding to the seven ERM fundamental concepts and
related items of interest (see Table 3). Data have been categorized as categorical
variables ranging from 0 to 5 to investigate public disclosure as well, where the
value of 0 reflects no disclosure on the specific item.
Finally, once coded both the survey and the report for each company, the author
summed up the scores attributed to each item to define an ERM score ranging from 0
to 53 for both the disclosure sources (private and public). To verify the level of ERM
disclosure variation the author computes the difference between the scores attributed
respectively to the report and the survey, specifically as:
ERM_Variation_I ndex = ERM_Report Score−ERM_Survey Score (1)
ERM_Variation_Index if positive is interpreted as an overstatement in the public
disclosure; vice versa, if negative, as an understatement of the ERM process in the
public voluntary disclosure. To better analyze the extent of ERM_Variation_Index
and its determinants, such a score is distinguished into two sets (high vs. low) repre-
senting the level of information INCONSISTENCY between the sources of disclo-
sures. It amounts to the dummy dependent variable on which the hypothesized CG
and firm’s risk characteristics are regressed (as outlined below).
4.1 Research Model for Testing Hypotheses
A Probit model is used to test the association between INCONSISTENCY and the
hypothesized determinants6:
I NCONSI ST ENCY = β0 + β1BOARD + β2OWNERSH I P
+ β3LEV ERAGE + β4MT B_RAT I O
+ β5CONT ROL V ARI ABLES + ε (2)
Control variables are justified as following. First, based on agency theory, high-
quality risk disclosure is needed for large firms to satisfy the requests of a larger
group of stakeholders (Amran et al. 2009). In addition, larger companies have an
incentive to improve investors’ confidence and reduce political sensitivities by pro-
viding higher quality risk disclosure (Hassan 2009). Previous studies reveal a positive
association between firm size and risk disclosure quantity (Linsley and Shrives 2005,
6A detailed definition of each variable is provided at Table 5.
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Table 3 Description of report and survey coding
COSO ERM fundamental
concepts
ERM
items of
interest
Description Report (n
= 66)
Survey (n
= 66)
Test of
difference
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. T-test of
means
(two-
sided)
Test of
median
Wilcoxon
test
1. A process, ongoing and
flowing through an entity
1 Extent of ERM
implementation
1.575758 2.327499 3.924242 1.256498 −8.8959*** −5.929***
2. Effected by people at every
level of an organization
2a Training activities
about risk and risk
management
0.1363636 0.7822328 3.318182 1.266845 −17.625*** −7.025***
2b Business plan
resource allocation
for ERM
1.69697 2.183643 2.969697 1.380855 −3.9513*** −3.557***
3. Applied in strategy setting 3 ERM relation with
strategic planning
2.712121 2.021158 3.469697 1.349868 −3.0417** −2.368**
4. Applied across the enterprise,
at every level and unit, and
includes taking an entity-level
portfolio view of risk
4a Identification and
prioritization of risks
2.484848 2.451012 4.727273 0.5696275 −7.8719*** −5.687***
4b Methodology used
for risk prioritization
1.060606 0.5038315 1.666667 0.4750169 −5.5177*** −4.588***
4c Extent of integration
in risk prioritization
1.30303 1.968754 3.939394 0.8923398 −11.556*** −6.605***
(continued)
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2006; Abraham and Cox 2007; Dobler et al. 2011; Elshandidy et al. 2013). In addi-
tion, larger companies also have the expertise and resources to cover the cost of
producing high-quality disclosure (Miihkinen 2012). Proprietary cost theory indeed
would suggest that managers in large firms will disclose more risk information than
those in small firms having larger competitive disadvantage. Thus, both the theories
support a negative relation between size and information inconsistency about the
ERM process.
Second, literature also supported the relationship between performance measures
and levels of disclosures. To investigate such relation, the current study analyzes the
Tobin’s Q ratiomeasuring the firm’s performance on the capital market (Gordon et al.
2009; Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011; McShane et al. 2011). The higher Tobin’s Q is, the
better is the judgment expressed by the financial market about the company repre-
senting a measure of future investors’ expectations (Florio and Leoni 2017). Agency
theory suggests that managers disclose information for promoting personal interests
as a number of prior studies documented the relation betweenmanagers’ stock-based
compensation and extent of disclosures (for all Murphy 1996). Proprietary cost the-
ory would suggest that more profitable companies have lower costs of disclosing
information, even if evidence show mixed results (Leuz 1999; Giner et al. 1997).
Both the theories therefore suggest a negative relationship between profitability and
information inconsistency about the ERM process.
Third, different industries may provide different risk and risk management pro-
cess disclosure because of industry specific characteristics and regulations. Beretta
and Bozzolan (2004) find no relation between industry and risk disclosure. Hassan
(2009) instead find a significant relation with variation in corporate risk disclosure.
Further, financial industry is quite specific operating under a greater layer of increased
regulation and scrutiny (see Basel III; Solvency II; ORSA). As the financial compa-
nies constitute the 20% of the total sample, the current study controls for industry
effects by including the financial industry as a control variable (Amran et al. 2009).
In particular, financial companies being enforced of greater disclosure on risk man-
agement effectiveness are expected to signal a lower information inconsistency about
the ERM process.
Finally, another factor that can affect ERM disclosure and specifically the
(in)consistency between private and public disclosure is for how long the companies
have adopted the process (defined as ERM experience). On one side, agency the-
ory would suggest that companies implementing the ERM process for a longer time
would be more willing to disclose about it. On the other side, companies having an
ERMprocess for a longer period could incur in higher proprietary costs and therefore
are expecting having a greater variation between private and public disclosure. As
best of the author’s knowledge no prior literature has examined such a relation.
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5 Results and Analysis
5.1 Nature and Extent of ERM Disclosures Variation (RQ1)
Findings reveal that companies tend to give more information on their ERM process
through the private source (survey) rather than in their public disclosure (CG report).
Data provided by the on-line surveys about the internal ERMprocess are self-reported
and cannot be independently verified. Nevertheless, all respondents indicate the com-
pany name and their e-mail contact (voluntary option). The author is not aware of
any reason why a survey participant would willfully falsify their responses and she
believes the responses obtained provide an opportunity to explore information about
their internal ERM process. As a way of assurance and to find confirmation about the
reliability of the answers, after the analysis, fifteen respondents have been randomly
interviewed to better understand how the risk management disclosure process works
and if they were in charge of it. The results of this “triangulation” check (Routhbauer
2008) confirmed their high knowledge of the risk management process and their
key role in the preparation of the CG report section related to the disclosure of the
Internal Control Risk Management System. Thus, assuring the reliability of the data
collected through the survey.
Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation values of each ERM item exam-
ined both in the survey and in the report. Additionally, it presents the results of a
test of difference in mean and median. Results in detail show that the extent of ERM
implementation (item 1) is one of the item most privately disclosed. On average it
takes value of 3.9242, while in the public reports its extent is described on average
with a value of 1.5758. The most highly privately disclosed item relates to the infor-
mation about the identification and prioritization of risks (item 4a) with an average
value near to the maximum of 5. Whereas, on the voluntary public disclosure side,
it is disclosed for a value on average equal to 2.48. Among the most highly privately
disclosed items there are also the ones referring to the extent of integration in risk
prioritization (item 4c) and to the level of comprehensiveness of risks considered
(item 7).
Looking at the public reports, the most highly disclosed factors are the ones
referring to the application in the strategy setting (item 3) and to the frequency of risk
managers’ meetings (item 6b). Specifically, companies on average publicly disclose
to link their ERM process to the strategic planning with a value of almost 3 out of the
5 scale, even if privately such a value results higher. The highest value corresponding
to the item about the frequency of risk reporting is publicly declared higher than 4,
that is at least annually; while in the private disclosure source companies on average
declare a value lower than 4.
Overall, from what directly emerge from the surveys, companies on average indi-
cated the presence of 39.12 out of the maximum 53 values that ERM survey score
can assume. In contrast, their public CG reports revealed the presence of 21.29 out
of the 53 values of the ERM report score. This suggests that while there may be a
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high degree of ERM maturity (Beasley et al. 2015) within companies, those entities
on average are not so willing to voluntary public disclose of it.
The test of difference (two-sided) in means reveals a significant univariate differ-
ence for all the twelve items of interest examined. Specifically, the mean is highly
negative significantly different (p < 0.001) for the items related to: the extent of
implementation, the training activities about risk and risk management, the business
plan resource allocation for the ERM process, the identification and prioritization of
risks, the methodology used for risk prioritization, the extent of integration in risk
prioritization, the frequency of risk reporting, the temporal orientation of risk report-
ing and the level of comprehensiveness. With the exemption of the item related to the
frequency of ERM managers’ meetings presenting a positive significant difference
in mean (p < 0.05), the remaining items related to the ERM relation with strategic
planning and to the ERM process accountable person show a negative difference
in mean (p < 0.05). Thus, with the exclusion of the frequency of ERM managers’
meetings, all the items present a higher mean for data obtained from a private source
of information compared to the public disclosure. Such results are also confirmed by
the Wilcoxon test of difference in median.
Given these findings, the author further dug into the ERM voluntary disclosure
and the differences between information privately obtained by the companies and
publicly available. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the companies per each level
of ERM_Variation_Index. The companies of the sample are normally distributed
in a range from −40 to +7. With the exemption of the positive extreme of the
range, all companies’ ERM_Variation_Index present negative sign, stressing the
lower level of public disclosure on ERM rather than that obtained from the private
channel. The mean of the distribution (−17.86) is considered as the threshold to
distinguish firms into two sets: high versus low ERM_Variation_Index (see Table 4).
A low variation is considered to be in those firms falling in the interval [−17.86;
Fig. 1 Distribution of the companies per each level of ERM_Variation_Index
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Table 4 ERM disclosure (in)consistency: high versus low variation
ERM_Variation_Index # Companies (In)consistency
−40 1 High variation/inconsistency
−38 1
−35 1
−34 1
−32 1
−31 2
−30 2
−29 1
−28 1
−27 2
−26 2
−24 1
−23 3
−22 3
−21 1
−20 5
−18 3
−17 3 Low variation/consistency
−16 6
−15 3
−14 2
−13 3
−12 2
−11 3
−10 1
−9 2
−8 1
−7 1
−5 3
−4 3
−2 1
7 1
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+7] and it is interpreted as a higher level of information consistency. Vice versa,
results external to such interval are considered to be representative of information
inconsistency. According to such a distinction about half of the companies (35 out of
66) are consistent in term of ERM disclosure, while 31 are not. Thus, it follows the
aim of the second research question of understanding which are the determinants of
the ERM disclosure (in)consistency comparing the two opposite sets (high vs. low
variation).
5.2 Determinants of Inconsistency Between Private Source
of Information and Public Disclosure on ERM (RQ2)
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis. Descriptive statistics in Table 5
show the dependent (dummy) variable mean equals to 0.4696 meaning almost 47%
of the companies tend to have high disclosure variation. Thereby, on the opposite
side 53% of the companies have a low disclosure variation demonstrating relatively
consistent private and public disclosures. Corporate governance factor such as board
independence variable shows on average boards are composed by 44.48%of indepen-
dent directors, representing less than half of the board. Companies for the 57.57%
are owned by a single person controlling more than the 50% of the shares.7 The
accounting literature generally defines a company as dominated by a controlling
shareholder when there is at least one owner who has 10% or more of the voting
rights. It must be pointed out that Italian companies, even when listed on an official
securities market, are in most cases family controlled. This means that even when a
large portion of a company’s equity is widespread among investors on the market,
there is no real separation between owners and managers (Prencipe 2004).
For what concern firms’ risk characteristics, the average amount of leverage is
61.27% showing Italian listed companies mostly rely on debt as tool for financing
their activities. The systematic risk of the company on average is pretty high having
a mean of 0.7552 (not shown in the Table). Market to book ratio has a mean of 2.831
interpreted as a pretty high undervaluation of stocks in the market. The average
of the natural logarithm of revenues is equal to 12; for a better understanding of
the amount of companies’ revenues see details in Table 2. The market profitability
of the companies is on average equals to 0.1083, confirming the undervaluation
of the stocks value. Financial companies represent almost the 20% of the sample.
Finally, regarding the years of ERM experience, companies on average declare to
have implemented the process for a period ranging between 3 and 5 years.
The results of the Spearman rank correlation are presented in Table 6. They show
a correlation at 10% level of market to book ratio and the control variable ERM expe-
rience with the dependent variable (INCONSISTENCY). Thus, suggesting potential
associations also in the regression analysis. Few correlations among independent
7Additional descriptive statistics not inserted in Table 5a show ownership concentration in the
sample is on average 47.86%.
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics
Heading level Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Inconsistency 0.469697 0.5029053 0.00 1.00
Independent variables
Board 0.4448 0.1582446 0.1538 0.8947
Concentration 0.5757576 0.4980147 0.00 1.00
Leverage 0.6127 0.2098272 0.00055 1.109
Market_to_book 2.831 4.422469 0.07895 26.33
Size_revenue 12.67 2.48213 8.16 23.24
TobinQ 0.1083272 0.5017228 0.0001009 2.901489
Financial 0.197 0.4007569 0.00 1.00
ERM_experience 2.651515 1.24644 1.00 5.00
Notes Variables are described as following: INCONSISTENCY = equal to 1 if
ERM_Variation_Index is high, that is negatively beyond the mean (equals to−17. 86364), 0 other-
wise (see Table 5). BOARD= number of independent directors out of the total number of directors;
OWNERSHIP = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the highest percentage of shares owned by a
single shareholder is over the 50%, 0 otherwise. LEVERAGE = defined as the ratio between total
liabilities and total assets (sourced by Compustat database); MTB_RATIO = market to book ratio,
measured as the market capitalization over the book value of shareholder’s equity at the end of the
year (Compustat database). SIZE_REVENUE = the natural logarithm of the total revenues (Com-
pustat database); TOBINQ = performance on the capital market at the end of the year, measured
as market value of equity plus book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets (sourced
by Compustat database). FINANCIAL = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the company belongs to
the financial industry as classified by Borsa Italiana; ERM_experience = how long the companies
declare to have adopted the risk management process [1 = less than 6 months; 2 = at least 1 year;
3 = at least 3 years; 4 = at least 5 years; 5 = at least 10 years]
variables are also found. Tests on multicollinearity and endogeneity suggest data do
not present such issues.8
Inconsistency between Private and Public Disclosure: Determinants. Table 7
presents the results of the empirical Probit model developed to answer the second
research question.
Results of the probit model show both the corporate governance characteristics
are significantly associated to information inconsistency on ERM. Either the proxy
for board independence and the variable related to the percentage of control present
the expected sign. Results indeed show the number of independent directors has a
negative significant impact on the information inconsistency about the ERM process
(p < 0.05), while higher levels of ownership concentration positively affect such
information inconsistency (p < 0.1). Hypotheses 1 and 2 are therefore supported.
8Multicollinearity was checked by the variance inflation factor (VIF) test. VIF value of 1.22 for this
model ruled out a multicollinearity problem. IVprobit test for endogeneity displays no endogenous
variables.
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Table 7 Probit model results Inconsistency Coefficient
Board −0.0285908**
(0.036)
Ownership −0.7044636*
(0.064)
Leverage 2.525829**
(0.020)
Mtb_ratio −0.1451485**
(0.013)
Size_revenue −0.1461361*
(0.071)
TobinQ 6.501505
(0.154)
Financial −0.9844539*
(0.094)
ERM_experience 0.2729999*
(0.086)
Constant 0.6978686
(0.579)
No. of observations 66
Prob > Chi2 0.0025
Pseudo-R2 0.2602
Notes Amounts in parentheses are p-values. ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
For what concern firm risk characteristics, a positive and significant result (p <
0.05) is found for leverage thus supporting the association stated in hypothesis 3 and
contributing to prior mixed results. Results show firms more leveraged are generally
less forthcoming in public disclosures about their ERM processes. A significant
association (p < 0.05) is also found for themarket to book ratio variable. In contrast to
findings related to leverage, the relationwith such afirm risk characteristic is negative.
It indicates more consistent information on the ERM process at the companies’
financial risk increase. Hypothesis 4 is also supported.
Among control variables companies size and industry have a negative significant
association with the dependent variable (p < 0.1). This shows that bigger companies
have more consistent disclosures supporting expectations. The variable related to
industry shows that financial companies are negatively significant related to incon-
sistency, again supporting expectations. That is, given financial companies have dif-
ferent characteristics, and in particular stronger regulations about risk management
it is expected they have greater disclosure consistency. Further, contrary to expecta-
tionsmarket firmprofitability is not associated to information inconsistency about the
ERMprocess. Finally, interestingly the variable proxying for firm’s ERM experience
is positively significant associated (p < 0.1) to inconsistency; at the enhancement of
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Table 8 Probit model on companies having lower versus greater ERM_experience
Inconsistency Panel A
Coefficient
Panel B
Coefficient
Board −0.0266093
(0.429)
−0.0315463*
(0.074)
Ownership 0.4272366
(0.718)
1.027232**
(0.047)
Leverage 4.977333**
(0.025)
2.404916
(0.140)
Mtb_ratio −1.08703
(0.045)**
0.0575061
(0.601)
Size_revenue −0.0245758
(0.952)
−0.0912594
(0.288)
TobinQ −18.4437
(0.541)
5.433301
(0.385)
Financial −2.183997*
(0.067)
0.1258688
(0.882)
ERM_experience 0.1982419
(0.962)
0.4190353
(0.785)
Constant −0.0266093
(0.429)
−0.0315463*
(0.074)
No. of observations 29 37
Prob > Chi2 0.0024 0.1099
Pseudo-R2 0.5740 0.2297
Notes PANEL A. Probit model on companies having lower ERM experience (ERM_experience <
3); PANEL B. Probit model on companies having greater ERM experience (ERM_experience≥ 3)
ERM experience, measured in term of years of adoption, it is found greater informa-
tion inconsistency about the process.
The tested model has an explanatory power with a pseudo-R2 equal to 0.2602.
Overall, results show that highest levels of disclosure variation on ERM are either
associated to CG characteristics and to firm’s risk characteristics.
Given the significance of the variable ERM experience, further investigation is
requested on this aspect. At this aim the model is tested splitting companies into
two sets: those having a shorter experience (less than 3 years of adoption) and those
having a longer experience of ERM adoption (equal or longer than 3 years). Results
are shown in Table 8 panel A and B, respectively.
Table 8 (panel A) shows how the explanatory power of the model increases to a
pseudo-R2 of 0.5740. Findings reflect a situation inwhich just firm’s risk factors affect
information inconsistency on ERM, supporting hypotheses 3 and 4. Specifically,
leverage maintains a positive significant association (p < 0.05) and market to book
ratio a negative significant association (p < 0.05) with inconsistency. Whereas, both
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the CG variables lose their association with the dependent variable. Among the
control variables just financial industry (p < 0.1) confirm prior results.
Examining data for companies declaring to adopt ERM for longer, Table 8 (panel
B) shows instead just CG variables significantly affect ERM information incon-
sistency, supporting hypotheses 1 and 2. However, no other variable of the model
appears affecting the dependent variable in this set.
To summarize, findings of the complete model reveal how both CG variables
(board independence and ownership’s concentration) and firm’s risk factors (leverage
and market to book ratio) affect information inconsistency on the ERM process.
Nevertheless, controlling for the level of ERM process’ experience, interestingly
it emerges how in companies adopting the process in recently time the disclosure
inconsistency is driven by firm’s risk factors, while for companies more mature in
terms of ERM adoption the inconsistency is driven just by CG characteristics.
Sensitivity Analysis. A sensitivity analysis on an identical model has been run
using an alternative variable to the dummy related to the ownership concentration.
Specifically, the highest percentage of shares owned by a single shareholder has been
adopted. Results (not shown in the paper) confirm the significant association with the
independent variables (hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 are supported). Specifically, it shows
a negative and significant relation between board independence, market to book ratio
and inconsistency. Whereas, it shows a positive and significant association between
ownership concentration and leverage with inconsistency. Among control variable
just size maintains the significance.
The slight significance of financial companies’ variable in the findings represented
in Table 6 would suggest for further investigation. However, given impossibility to
run the same model either on non-financial and financial companies because of the
small sample of the latter (n= 13), Table 9 aims at showing the results of the model
just on non-financial companies. Findings confirm the role of both risk factors in the
association with information inconsistency (both hypothesis 3 and 4 are supported).
CG variables play a partial role in the association with inconsistency: only board
independence is found negatively significant (hypothesis 1 is supported; hypothesis
2 is not). Among control variables just size maintains its significance.
Finally, given six of the respondent companies participated to the survey both the
years 2013 and 2015, an additional analysis has been run not considering the 2015
data for those companies. In such a way the sample for the two years become more
homogeneous with 28 companies in 2013 and 32 in 2015. Results confirm all the
hypotheses. Significant associations between CG variables (board independence and
ownership concentration at p < 0.05) and firm’s risk variables (leverage andmarket to
book ratio at p < 0.05) are found. The control variables too are confirmed significant
as in the original model: companies’ size, financial companies and ERM experience
(Table 10).
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Table 9 Probit model on
non-financial companies
Inconsistency Coefficient
Board −0.0391189**
(0.012)
Ownership 0.5777792
(0.175)
Leverage 3.216437**
(0.011)
Mtb_ratio −0.1362497**
(0.037)
Size_revenue −0. 151717*
(0.081)
TobinQ 1.272287
(0.411)
Financial 0.1420315
(0.141)
ERM_experience 1.235772
(0.397)
Constant −0.0391189**
(0.012)
No. of observations 53
Prob > Chi2 0.0047
Pseudo-R2 0.2789
6 Discussion and Conclusions
Over the last years an increasing call has emerged at the international level for effec-
tive risk management processes within organizations and for greater transparency
about that. Emerging academic research provides limited evidence about the ERM
implementation around the world while still little is known about how companies
publicly disclose information related to their ERM process. The current paper con-
tributes to prior research offering meaningful insights about which factors compa-
nies disclose both publicly and privately, finding some variation between these two
sources.
Variation determined as difference between information obtained from CG report
and the submitted survey respectively, underlines how companies even if adopting
an effective ERM process according to COSO (2004) are sometimes less willing
to voluntary disclose of it. Specifically, companies tend to understate information
about: the extent of their ERM process implementation; the training activities about
risk and risk management put in place; the business plan resources allocated for
the ERM process; the ERM relation with the strategic planning; the identification
and prioritization of risks; the methodology used for risk prioritization; the extent
of integration in risk prioritization; the frequency of risk reporting and its temporal
orientation; the ERM process accountable person; and, the level of comprehensive-
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Table 10 Probit model with
no data 2015 for those
companies answering both
the survey’s years
Inconsistency Coefficient
Board −0.0415123**
(0.013)
Ownership 1.024538**
(0.022)
Leverage 2.73705**
(0.018)
Mtb_ratio −0.1603119**
(0.012)
Size_revenue −0.1725365**
(0.050)
TobinQ 6.833866
(0.161)
Financial −1.040656*
(0.097)
ERM_experience 0.4379525**
(0.026)
Constant 1.015507
(0.444)
No. of observations 60
Prob > Chi2 0.0020
Pseudo-R2 0.2925
ness of risks considered. These results support previous findings about the company
managers’ preference of providing risk related disclosure that are formal rather than
substantial (Abraham and Shrives 2014; Tufano 1996) understating their effective
ERM process.
On the contrary, companies tend to overstate information related to the frequency
of ERM managers’ meetings. This latter result may be explained by the risk man-
agement duties requested by the CG code. Specifically, the need to report to the
board at least biyearly (see Table 1). Thus, suggesting potential “boiler plate” infor-
mation (Woods et al. 2008). It follows, the study additionally investigates which are
the determinants of ERM disclosure inconsistency identifying both CG and firms’
risk characteristics as significant drivers of it. Among corporate governance charac-
teristics, the association with board independence is stronger than the one between
ownership’s concentration and ERM disclosure inconsistency. The study also finds
that firm’s risk characteristics such as leverage and market to book ratio are signif-
icantly associated to ERM disclosure inconsistency, even if according to opposite
signs. Companies having a greater level of debt tend to be more inconsistent on ERM
disclosure supporting the results by Elshandidy et al. (2013) which identify lever-
age as a determinant of risk voluntary disclosure; while, companies having greater
market to book ratio present a negative sign of the association, showing greater con-
sistency. Both results support proprietary cost theory expectations. These findings
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may contribute to prior results and to a still understudied relation between firm’s risk
characteristics and ERM process disclosure (Buckby et al. 2015).
Among control variables, firm size and financial industry have a light negative
significant influence on ERMdisclosure inconsistency. This in line with the expected
sign according to both the tested theories. The latter finding about financial compa-
nies, in particular, suggests that the greater specific regulations requested for those
firms—including also disclosure on ERM—is not so much reflected into their CG
reports. In addition, it is found a positive and slightly significant relation with the so
called ERM experience—the years of ERM adoption the companies declared. Such a
positive relation appears to support proprietary cost theory according to which com-
panies limit voluntary disclosure when proprietary costs emerge from it. Information
on the ERM process is perceived proprietary in nature, mainly at the beginning of
the companies ERM experience, thus affecting the decision by the firms to not fully
disclose about it. Indeed, a deeper investigation shows this variable has an impact on
results when the sample of companies is split according to a shorter or longer ERM
experience. Such additional investigation helps to verify that for companies with
lower ERM experience the greater disclosure inconsistency on the process is driven
by firm’s risk factors. In contrast, for those companies having greater ERM experi-
ence the drivers of disclosure inconsistency are corporate governance variables, in
particular the fact of being closely held by a single owner, condition pretty common
in the context analyzed. In line with the results by Buckby et al. (2015) which find
that board independence does not impact on the level of risk management disclosure
in the Australian context, the additional test finds that this factor does not affect
so much inconsistency between public and private source of information on ERM.
Thus suggesting that board independence acts just partially as control mechanisms of
information asymmetry on such a topic. The relationship between ERM and CG is of
interest to regulators because less concentrated ownership and independent directors
are expected to reduce agency problems (Abraham and Cox 2007). Therefore, the
results of the current study demand for carrying on the international reflection about
the need for reducing regulatory intervention on corporate reporting.
Thus, all together the findings mainly support proprietary cost interpretation, the
additional analysis based on the distinction of shorter versus longer ERM experience
helps to orient even more towards such an interpretation in contrast to the agency
one.
The paper has both theoretical and practical implications. First, from a theoretical
point of view, it contributes to literature on risk disclosure focusing on risk manage-
ment practices instead of risk factors. Second, the paper originally contributes to the
literature benefiting of private information on the internal ERM process and com-
paring such information to public disclosure of it. In addition, the study investigates
a new variable (ERM experience) which is found to affect the ERM process disclo-
sure and that asks for future investigations. Third, prior research mainly analyzes
non-financial setting while the current study takes into account also financial com-
panies surprisingly showing that such industry does not affect so much the analyzed
relation. Finally, results contribute to the recent risk management disclosure stream
of literature not focusing on the annual report but investigating other kind of public
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sources such as the CG reports (Buckby et al. 2015; Florio and Leoni 2017) extending
prior studies focusing on the Italian context (Arena et al. 2011; Elshandidy and Neri
2015; Florio and Leoni 2017). In particular, the paper contributes to prior findings
given the double perspective offered by data obtained through a survey compared to
what companies publicly voluntary disclose. The resulting inconsistency between the
two sources suggests a general understatement of public voluntary disclosure and
a potential underestimation of the investors’ benefits prior international literature
identifies. Thus, due to perceived proprietary costs that companies suffer, additional
research is needed to identify the potential benefits that companies might have when
disclosing more informative disclosure on ERM.
From a practical point of view, the results appear to support the decision of the
Italian stock exchangeCGcommittee to increasing transparency through the compul-
sorily enhancement of the risk management process disclosure. In particular, given
riskier companies tend to have higher variation scores, the findings would suggest
not only for a mandatory disclosure regime but also for the adoption of a stricter rule-
based approach instead of a principle-based approach. Indeed, just because riskier
companies publicly disclose less, it is expected that if they are asked to be compliant
to a principle-based approach on ERM process disclosure they continue to act in the
same way (in the absence of a CG report audit). A further investigation of the same
context after the year 2015 may provide empirical evidences on the superiority, or
not, of a mandatory disclosure on risk management processes.
The paper’s results may lead to contribute to the international increasing attention
and push on Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as part of good CG, and to the
debate about the different investors’ benefits from the enhancement of risk man-
agement disclosure (Baxter et al. 2013; Campbell et al. 2014). The study can shed
light to understand if CG reports information content is informative to stakehold-
ers given also the international increasing interest for the assessment of companies’
“management and governance”. Specifically, such assessment, with reference to the
effectiveness of risk management processes, is based on information (mostly not
publicly disclosed) provided by the entity to rating agencies as part of the credit
evaluation process (see Standard & Poor’s 2012). Therefore, finding public disclo-
sure on ERM process is undervalued compared to the internal process described
through private disclosure, the research empirically shows how—in the analyzed
context—ERM public disclosure may not be informative about the effective quality
of “management and governance”. Thus, requiring further investigation.
Findings can also contribute to the academic call to investigate the dilemma
between better and more regulation, in times where the issue of compliance and
risk management becomes more important for top management (AIDEA 2017). The
paper suggests the limits of voluntary disclosure regulation and the conditions under
which this happened showing how companies tend to not fully disclose their effec-
tive internal ERM process. Specifically, the paper allows to identify the presence of
disclosure’s proprietary costs associated to CG and firm’s risk characteristics, and the
condition under which they became manifest—that is the years of ERM experience.
These are factors the regulators should take into account when recommend informa-
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tion on such a topic. Finally, the study can also contribute to the current debate about
the Integrated Reporting (IIRC IR 2013).
The paper however presents many limitations. First of all, the sample size asso-
ciated to the specificity of a voluntary disclosure context could affect the generaliz-
ability of results in different settings. Second, the construction of the variables leave
room for alternatives; sensitivity analysis attempt tomitigate such a limitation. Future
research that captures potential inconsistency between private and public disclosure
on ERM in different settings could enable to extend the debate. Finally, an analysis
of the same context after the 2015 CG code review may help to investigate changes
in the behavior of the company under a stricter disclosure regime.
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Appendix: Survey
The survey questions about an ERM process were developed using the seven fun-
damental concepts defining ERM from the COSO framework as a basis. Twelve
questions in the survey map to the seven fundamental concepts from COSO to oper-
ationalize them. Thus, scores based on the 12 factorswere created based on the survey
responses and scores based on the same 12 factors were created based on the reading
of the CG reports. Specifically, as summarized in Table 3, the first concept—defin-
ing ERM as a process on-going and flowing through the entity—is composed by
one factor identifying the extent of ERM implementation (Paape and Speklé 2012).
The second concept relates to the participation extent of people at every level of the
organization. Therefore, the two factors by which it is composed respectively ask
for training activities (Beasley et al. 2015) and business plan resources allocated to
the ERM process (NCSU & Protiviti report 2016). Both these factors indeed aim at
widening the ERM scope among people within the organization.
The third fundamental concept is about the application in the strategy setting and
thereby the factor investigates the relation of ERM with strategic planning (Frigo
and Anderson 2011; Beasley et al. 2015; COSO framework draft 2016). The fourth
concept is composed by three factors investigating the identification andprioritization
of risks, the methodology used for risk prioritization, and the extent of integration9
in risk prioritization to verify the application of the process across the enterprise
(Arena et al. 2011; Paape and Speklé 2012). In particular, Arena et al. (2011) in
their study based on the Italian setting find that generally an entity’s risk evaluation
method comprises a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques. Also
9The integration concept introduced by Arena et al. (2011) refer to how risks are governed within
all levels and functions of an organization.
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other studies find a combination of the two methodologies (Woods 2009; Jordan
et al. 2013; Mikes 2009). Thus, for this factor based on a three-point scale and
related to the methodology used for risk prioritization, it is attributed a 1 only in the
case both the methodologies are applied by the company, 0 otherwise.
Then, the ERM process according to the fifth concept needs to be designed to
identify potential events that, if they occur, will affect the entity and to manage risk
within its risk appetite. A crucial element to identify potential events is a frequent
communication in terms of risk reporting (Paape and Speklé 2012). Thus, the current
study aims to investigate the frequency of risk reporting and its temporal orientation
(back vs. forward-looking). Considering the proactive aimofERM, the coding choice
is to attribute a 1 if respondents answer forward-looking, 0 otherwise.
The sixth concept relates to the ERM process’ ability to provide reasonable assur-
ance to an entity’s management and board of directors. Beasley et al. (2005) is the
first study identifying Chief Risk Officer role (or a person having the same role but
with a different title) as a good proxy for ERM effectiveness. The presence of such
a person in charge for the process can provide the requested reasonable assurance
of the ERM process (Baxter et al. 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli 2013). Another related
factor providing assurance to the process is the frequency of riskmanagers’meetings.
Finally, the seventh concept geared to the achievement of objectives in one or more
separate but overlapping categories is operationalized in a question asking for the
level of comprehensiveness (i.e. range of risks) considered (Arena et al. 2011). Risks
can be classified according many overlapping categories linked to the companies’
goals, such as strategic, operative, compliance and reporting (COSO 2004; AICPA&
NCSU 2016). Wider and more holistic level of risks comprehensiveness considered
can contribute to overcame a silo-based approach and to the companies’ objectives
achievement.
For a detail about the survey/report factors and corresponding five-point scale
answers see the following.
Concept 1. A process, ongoing and flowing through an entity
Item 1. How much has Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) process been imple-
mented?
1. Risk management is mainly incident-driven; no plans exist to implement ERM.
2. We actively control risk in specific areas (e.g. health & safety, financial risk); we
are considering to implement a complete ERM.
3. We identify, assess and control risk in specific areas;we are planning to implement
a complete ERM.
4. We identify, assess and control strategic, financial, operational and compliance
risks; we are in the process of implementing a complete ERM.
5. We identify, assess and control strategic, financial, operational and compliance
risks; ERM is an integral part of the (strategic) planning & control cycle.
Concept 2. Effected by people at every level of an organization
Item 2. Are training activities about risk carried out?
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1. Not at all
2. Minimally
3. Somewhat
4. Mostly
5. Extensively
Item 3. Are business plan resources allocated to ERM initiatives?
1. Not at all
2. Minimally
3. Somewhat
4. Mostly
5. Extensively
Concept 3. Applied in strategy setting
Item 4. To make stronger the responsibilities is there a relation between capital
allocation, budget decisions and identified risks? Namely, risk management process
is related to strategic planning?
1. Not at all
2. Minimally
3. Somewhat
4. Mostly
5. Extensively
Concept 4. Applied across the enterprise, at every level and unit, and includes
taking an entity-level portfolio view of risk
Item 5. Do you identify and prioritize risks?
1. No at all
2. Minimally
3. Somewhat
4. Mostly
5. Extensively
Item 6. Which kind of methodology do you use to prioritize risks:
1. Qualitative: phenomenon description;
2. Quantitative: phenomenon description in monetary terms;
3. Both
Item 7. What is the extent of integration in risk prioritization?
1. Not at all widespread
2. Uncommon
3. Spread just at top levels: board and top management
4. Spread in the majority of the organization: board, top and middle managers
5. Enterprise widespread: board, top and middle managers and operative levels
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Concept 5. Designed to identify potential events that, if they occur, will affect
the entity and to manage risk within its risk appetite
Item 8. What is the frequency of general risk reporting?
1. Every 3 years or never
2. Once a year
3. Every 9 months
4. Twice a year (every 6 months)
5. Every 3 months or less
Item 9. Temporal orientation of risk reporting:
1. Past-looking (overcame risks)
2. Forward-looking (expected risks)
Concept 6. Able to provide reasonable assurance to an entity’smanagement and
board of directors
Item 10. Who is accountable for ERM process?
1. CEO
2. Internal Auditor
3. Board
4. Chief Risk Officer
5. Others (specify)
Item 11. ERM managers meeting: what is their frequency?
1. Every 3 years or never
2. Once a year
3. Every 9 months
4. Every 6 months
5. Every 3 months or less
Concept 7. Geared to achievement of objectives in one or more separate but
overlapping categories
Item 12. What is the level of comprehensiveness—range of risks considered (strate-
gic, operative, compliance and reporting risks…)?
1. Not at all
2. Minimally
3. Somewhat
4. Mostly
5. Extensively
120 S. Panfilo
References
Abraham, S., Cox, P.: Analysing the determinants of narrative risk information in UK FTSE 100
annual reports. Br. Account. Rev. 39(3), 227–248 (2007)
Abraham, S., Shrives, P.J.: Improving the relevance of risk factor disclosure in corporate annual
reports. Br. Account. Rev. 46(1), 91–107 (2014)
AICPA&NCSU: The State of Risk Oversight: An Overview of Enterprise Risk Management Prac-
tices. Available at: https://erm.ncsu.edu/az/erm/i/chan/library/AICPA_ERM_Research_Study_
2016.pdf (2016)
AIDEA: “New Trends” in Business Economics and Management Studies Rewriting the Relation-
ship between Business and Society. http://www.accademiaaidea.it/wpaidea/wp-content/uploads/
2016/12/CFP-AIDEA-2017-ENG1.pdf (2017)
Allegrini, M., Greco, G.: Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence
from Italian listed companies. J. Manage. Governance 17(1), 187–216 (2013)
Allini, A., Manes Rossi, F., Hussainey, K.: The Board’s Role in Risk Disclosure: An Exploratory
Study of Italian Listed State-Owned Enterprises. Public Money and Management (2016). http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2016.1118935
Amran, A., Bin, A.M.R., Hassan, B.C.H.M.: Risk reporting: an exploratory study on risk manage-
ment disclosure in Malaysian annual reports. Manag. Audit. J. 24(1), 39–57 (2009)
Arena, M., Arnaboldi, M., Azzone, G.: Is enterprise risk management real? J. Risk Res. 14(7),
779–797 (2011)
Ball, R., Kothari, S.P., Robin, A.: The effect of international institutional factors on properties of
accounting earnings. J. Account. Econ. 29(1), 1–51 (2000)
Baxter, R., et al.: Enterprise risk management program quality: determinants, value relevance, and
the financial crisis. Contemp. Account. Res. 30(4), 1264–1295 (2013)
Beasley,M., Branson, B., Pagach,D.:An analysis of thematurity and strategic impact of investments
in ERM. J. Account. Public Policy 34(3), 219–243 (2015)
Beasley, M.S., Clune, R., Hermanson, D.R.: Enterprise risk management: an empirical analysis of
factors associated with the extent of implementation. J. Account. Public Policy 24(6), 521–531
(2005)
Beasley, M., Pagach, D., Warr, R.: Information conveyed in hiring announcements of senior exec-
utives overseeing enterprise-wide risk management processes. J. Account. Audit. Financ. 23(3),
311–332 (2008)
Beretta, S., Bozzolan, S.: A framework for the analysis of firm risk communication. Int. J. Account.
39(3), 265–288 (2004)
Borsa Italiana: Codice di Autodisciplina. Available at: http://www.borsaitaliana.it/comitato-
corporate-governance/codice/2011.pdf (2011)
Borsa Italiana: Codice di Autodisciplina. Available at: http://www.borsaitaliana.it/comitato-
corporate-governance/codice/2015clean.pdf (2015)
Brown, I., Steen, A., Foreman, J.: Riskmanagement in corporate governance: a review and proposal.
Corp. Gov.: Int. Rev. 17(5), 546–558 (2009)
Buckby, S., Gallery, G., Ma, J.: An analysis of risk management disclosures: Australian evidence.
Manag. Audit. J. 30(8/9), 812–869 (2015)
Campbell, J.L., et al.: The information content of mandatory risk factor disclosures in corporate
filings. Rev. Account. Stud. 19(1), 396–455 (2014)
Chen, C.J.P., Jaggi, B.: Association between independent non-executive directors, family control
and financial disclosures in Hong Kong. J. Account. Public Policy 19, 285–310 (2000)
Collier, P.M., Berry, A.J., Burke, G.T.: Risk andManagement Accounting: Best Practice Guidelines
for Enterprise-Wide Internal Control Procedures, vol. 2. No. 11. Elsevier (2007)
Cormier, D., Magnan, M.: Environmental reporting management: a continental European perspec-
tive. J. Account. Public Policy 22(1), 43–62 (2003)
COSO: Enterprise risk management—Aligning Risk with Strategy and Performance. Available on
the internet at http://www.coso.org (2016)
(In)Consistency Between Private and Public Disclosure … 121
COSO: Enterprise risk management. Available on the internet at http://www.coso.org (2004)
Courtnage, S.: Financial reporting of risk. Tolley’s Pract. Audit. Account. 9(6), 61–63 (1998)
Dobler, M.: Incentives for risk reporting: a discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach. Int. J.
Account. 43(2), 184–206 (2008)
Dobler, M., Lajili, K., Zéghal, D.: Attributes of corporate risk disclosure: an international investi-
gation in the manufacturing sector. J. Int. Account. Res. 10(2), 1–22 (2011)
Ellul, A., Yerramilli, V.: Stronger risk controls, lower risk: evidence from U.S. bank holding com-
panies. J. Finance 68(5), 1757–1803 (2013)
Elshandidy, T., Neri, L.: Corporate governance, risk disclosure practices, and market liquidity:
comparative evidence from the UK and Italy. Corp. Gov.: Int. Rev. 23(4), 331–356 (2015)
Elshandidy, T., Fraser, I., Hussainey, K.: Aggregated, voluntary, and mandatory risk disclosure
incentives: evidence from UK FTSE all-share companies. Int. Rev. Financ. Anal. 30, 320–333
(2013)
EU Parliament and Council: Directive 2001/65/CE, del 27 settembre 2001, che modifica le direttive
78/660/CEE, 83/349/CEE e 86/635/CEE per quanto riguarda le regole di valutazione per i conti
annuali e consolidati di taluni tipi di società nonché di banche e di altre istituzioni finanziarie
(2001)
EU Parliament and Council: Directive 2006/46/CE, del 14 giugno 2006, che modifica le direttive
del Consiglio 78/660/CEE, relativa ai conti annuali di taluni tipi di società, 83/349/CEE, relativa
ai conti consolidati, 86/635/CEE, relativa ai conti annuali e ai conti consolidati delle banche e
degli altri istituti finanziari, e 91/674/CEE, relativa ai conti annuali e ai conti consolidati delle
imprese di assicurazione (2006)
EU Parliament and Council: Directive 2013/36/UE, del 26 giugno 2013, sull’accesso all’attività
degli enti creditizi e sulla vigilanza prudenziale sugli enti creditizi e sulle imprese di investimento,
che modifica la direttiva 2002/87/CE e abroga le direttive 2006/48/CE e 2006/49/CE (2013)
European Parliament and Council: Regulation (UE) n. 575/2013, del 26 giugno 2013, relativo ai
requisiti prudenziali per gli enti creditizi e le imprese di investimento e chemodifica il regolamento
(UE) n. 648/2012 (2013)
European Parliament and Council: Directive 2009/138/CE, del 25 novembre 2009, in materia di
accesso ed esercizio delle attività di assicurazione e di riassicurazione (solvibilità II) (2009)
Florio, C., Leoni, G.: Enterprise risk management and firm performance: the Italian case. Br.
Account. Rev. 49(1), 56–74 (2017)
Frigo, M.L., Anderson, R.J.: Strategic risk management: a foundation for improving enterprise risk
management and governance. J. Corp. Account. Financ. 81–88 (2011)
Francis, J., Nanda, D.J., Olsson, P.: Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. J.
Account. Res. 46(1), 53–99 (2008)
Giner, B., Ruiz, A., Cervera, N., Arce, A.: Accounting policy choice and the disclosure of segmental
information: Spanish evidence. In: Paper Presented at the 20thEAAAnnual Congress,Graz,April
(1997)
Gordon, L.A., Loeb, M.P., Tseng, C.: Enterprise risk management and firm performance: a contin-
gency perspective. J. Account. Public Policy 28(4), 301–327 (2009)
Hassan,M.K.: UAE corporations-specific characteristics and level of risk disclosure.Manag. Audit.
J. 24(7), 668–687 (2009)
Hayne, C., Free, C.: Hybridized professional groups and institutional work: COSO and the rise of
enterprise risk management. Account. Organ. Soc. 39(5), 309–330 (2014)
Healy, P., Palepu,K.: Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capitalmarkets: a review
of the empirical disclosure literature. J. Account. Econ. 31, 405–440 (2001)
Hoyt, R.E., Liebenberg,A.P.: The value of enterprise riskmanagement. J. Risk Insur. 78(4), 795–822
(2011)
IIRC: The International Integrated Reporting Framework. www.theiirc.org (2013)
IRDCEC: Documento n. 1. La Relazione sulla Gestione. Alcune considerazioni. Roma: Istituto di
Ricerca dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti Contabili (2008)
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H.: Theory of the firm: managerial. J. Financ. Econ. 3, 305–360 (1976)
122 S. Panfilo
Jordan, S., Jørgensen, L., Mitterhofer, H.: Performing risk and the project: risk maps as mediating
instruments. Manag. Account. Res. 24(2), 156–174 (2013)
Kajüter, P.: Risk disclosures of listed firms in Germany: a longitudinal study. In: 10th Financial
Reporting & Business Communication Conference, July, Cardiff Business School: Unpublished
(2006)
Lajili, K.: Board characteristics, ownership structure and risk disclosures: Canadian evidence. In:
30th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, April, Lisbon: Working Paper
(2007)
Lajili, K., Zeghal, D.: A content analysis of riskmanagement disclosures inCanadian annual reports.
Can. J. Adm. Sci. 22(2), 125–142 (2005)
Leuz, C.: Proprietary versus Non-Proprietary Disclosures: Voluntary Cash Flow Statements and
Business Segment Reports in Germany. Working Paper, Department of Business and Economics,
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat, Frankfurt (1999)
Linsley, P.M., Shrives, P.J.: Examining risk reporting in UK public companies. J. Risk Financ. 6(4),
292–305 (2005)
Linsley, P.M., Shrives, P.J.: Risk reporting: a study of risk disclosures in the annual reports of UK
companies. Br. Account. Rev. 38(4), 387–404 (2006)
Marshall, A., Weetman, P.: Information asymmetry in disclosure of foreign exchange risk manage-
ment: can regulation be effective? J. Econ. Bus. 54, 31–53 (2002)
Maizatulakma, A., et al.: Risk management disclosure: a study on the effect of voluntary risk
management disclosure toward firm value. J. Appl. Account. Res. 16(3), 400–432 (2015)
McShane, M.K., Nair, A., Rustambekov, E.: Does enterprise risk management increase firm value?
J. Account. Audit. Financ. 26(4), 641–658 (2011)
Miihkinen, A.: What drives quality of firm risk disclosure? The impact of a national disclosure
standard and reporting incentives under IFRS. Int. J. Account. 47(4), 437–468 (2012)
Mikes, A.: Risk management and calculative cultures. Manag. Account. Res. 20(1), 18–40 (2009)
Murphy, K.J.: Reporting choice and the 1992 proxy disclosure rules. J. Account. Audit. Financ.
11(3), 497–515 (1996)
NCSU & Protiviti.: Executive Perspectives on Top Risks for 2016. Key Issues Being Discussed
in the Boardroom and C-Suite. Research Conducted by North Carolina State University’s ERM
Initiative and Protiviti. Available at: https://www.protiviti.com/sites/default/files/united_states/
insights/nc-state-protiviti-survey-top-risks-2016.pdf (2016)
OECD: Risk Management and Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing. Available at: http://dx.
doi.org/10.1787/9789264208636-en (2014)
Oliveira, J., Lima Rodrigues, L., Craig, R.: Risk-related disclosures by non-finance companies.
Manag. Audit. J. 26(9), 817–839 (2011)
O’Sullivan, N.: The impact of board composition and ownership on audit quality: evidence from
large UK companies. Br. Account. Rev. 32(4), 397–414 (2000)
Paape, L., Speklé, R.F.: The adoption and design of enterprise risk management practices: an
empirical study. Eur. Account. Rev. 21(3), 533–564 (2012)
Patelli, L., Prencipe, A.: The relationship between voluntary disclosure and independent directors
in the presence of a dominant shareholder. Eur. Account. Rev. 16(1), 5–33 (2007)
Prencipe, A.: Proprietary costs and determinants of voluntary segment disclosure: evidence from
Italian listed companies. Eur. Account. Rev. 13(2), 319–340 (2004)
Rothbauer, P.: Triangulation. In: Given, L. (ed.) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research
Methods. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills (2008)
Standard and Poor’s: Methodology: Management and Governance Credit Factors for Corporate
Entities and Insurers. S&P, New York (2012)
Tao,N.B.,Hutchinson,M.:Corporate governance and riskmanagement: the role of riskmanagement
and compensation committee. J. Contemp. Account. Econ. 9, 83–99 (2013)
Tufano, P.: Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold
mining industry. J. Financ. 51(4), 1097–1137 (1996)
(In)Consistency Between Private and Public Disclosure … 123
Whitman, A.F.: Is ERM legally required? Yes for financial and governmental institutions, no for
private enterprises. Risk Manag. Insur. Rev. 18(2), 161–197 (2015)
Woods, M.: A contingency theory perspective on the risk management control system within birm-
ingham city council. Manag. Account. Res. 20(1), 69–81 (2009)
Woods, M., Dowd, K., Humphrey, C.: Market risk reporting by the world’s top banks: evidence on
the diversity of reporting practice and the implications for international accounting harmonisation.
Span. Account. Rev. 11(2), 9–41 (2008)
Verrecchia, R.E.: Discretionary disclosure. J. Account. Econ. 5, 179–194 (1983)
Zimmerman, J.L.: Conjectures regarding empirical managerial accounting research. J. Account.
Econ. 32(1–3), 411–427 (2001)
